Capital flows to South Asian and ASEAN countries : trends, determinants, and policy implications by Husain, Ishrat & Kwang W. Jun
*  i~~~~  PS  4'f2~
Policy  Reearch
WORKING  PAPERS
[  Debt  and  International  Finance
International  Eccmnomics  Department




to South  Asian
and  ASEAN  Countries
Trends,  Determinants,
and Policy  Implications
Ishrat Husain
and
Kwang  W. Jun
Foreign direct investment has been more influential than other
types of resource flows in shaping economic growth in ASEAN
countries.  South Asian policymakers can also  facilitate the
infusion of foreign direct investment flows if they pursue poli-
cies and nondistortionary incentive systems similar to those of
ASEAN countries.
The  Policy Research Working Papers dissemninate  the findings of  work in progress  and encourage theexcharngeof ideas among Bank  staff
and all others  interessd in developmnent  issues. These papers, distributed by the Research Advisory Staff, carry the names of the authors,
reflect onlytheirviews,  and should  beused and cited accordingly.  The findings,  interpretations, and conclusions are thcauthors'own. They

















































































































Debt  and International  Finance  |
'NPS  842
This  paper  -a  product  of  the Debt and  !ntemational  Finance  Division,  International  Economics
Department-is  part of a largereffort in the Department to analyze the trends and determinants of capital
flows  to developing  countries.  Copies of the paper  are available  free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street
NW, Washington DC 20433.  Please contact Sheilah King-Watson, room S8-040, extension 31047 (50
pages). January 1992.
Husain and Jun compare the experiences of  othei types of resource flows in shaping the
selected Asian countries in attracting different  economic growth of ASEAN countries.  Sub-
forms of external financing and examine how  stantial increases in ODA flows are unlikely, and
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The role of external finance in promoting economic growth in developing
countries has long been recognized and debated over the yePrs.  Theoretically,
less developed countries that are short of domestic resources can further their
economic expansion by utilizing foreign savings to the extent that the marginal
rate of return on domestic  investment exceeds the marginal cost of external
resources.  Under conditions of perfect capital  mobility, these flows  would also
help equalize rates of return on capital across countries and narrow development
gaps.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to draw any clearcut gennralization on the
way  external  capital  affects  domestic  economies  of  deve.oping  countries.
Differences  in the  abaorptive  capacity  of diverse  developing  economies  and
alternative forms  of capital  flows  that  exert heterogeneous  economic impacts  tena
to complicate the empirical analysis of development finance.  In addition, the
interpretation  and  cross-country comparison  of  aggregate  data  often  pose a number
of pitfalls.
Throughout the 1980s aggregate net resource flows to developing countries
as a  whole have  been stagnant.  While official development assistance (ODA)  from
all sources has increased somewhat, private flows have experienced a drastic
decline since the onset of the  debt crisis.  There are, however,  important
differences  in  the  trend  of  capital  flows  across  regions  and  individual
countries.  This paper focuses on capital flows to two selected groups of Asian
countries; South Asia and ASEAN.
The  primary  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  examine  the  comparative
experience of South Asian countries and ASEAN countries in attracting external
finance considering the different development strategies pursued  by the two sub-
groups in recent years.
1The paper is structured as follows:
Section  II  reviews  trends  of  capital  flows  to  South  Asia  and  ASEAN
countries  by major  types of flows,  namely;  official flows (which  include  official
grants, official concessional loans, and official non-concessicnal loans) and
private flows  (which include commercial bank loans, bond issues, and foreign
direct investment).  One of the most distinctive patterns across the regions has
been  uhat  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI) was  a dominant  form of  external
financing for ASEAN countries, whereas it remained a very insignificant source
of financing for South Asian countries.
Section III discusses a conceptual underpinning of the role of external
capital  in  economic  growth  and  its relationship  with  domestic  savings  and
investments.  It then considers some of the key issues related to the evolving
nature of capital  flows, including an empirical  analysis of the  effects of
foreign capital  flows on macroeconomic  performance  of developing  countries.
Empirical results  of simultaneous  regression  equations indicate  that  FDI, as  well
as export performance, has been  a significant positive factor determining the
economic growth in the region.
Section IV assesses prospecs  for external flows to developing countries
and the region, and explores impli  ,.ions  of these and empirical findings for
development policies of South Asia.  In view of poor prospects for substantial
increases  in  ODA flows (due  to economic slowdowr.-  in industrial  countries and  the
Gulf war) and the fact that significant international bank lending is unlikely
to  be  resumed,  policy-makers  in South  Asia  should  adopt policies  and  non-
distortionary incentive systems that are conducive to the infusion of foreign
direct  investment  (FDI).  Domestic  savings  should also be  mobilized  to the
largest extent possible.
2Section V provides a  summary and concluding remarks.
II.  RZCENM TRENDS IN NET RESOURCE FrQlW
1.  Classification  of  Resource  Flows  and  Global  Settina
External capital may be classified and analyzed in several  dimensions such
as origin, type and conditions.  Following the standard classification adopted
by  the  World  Bank  and  OECD,  capita;  flows to  developing  countries  can  be
decomposed broadly into official flows and private flows.
Official flows,  i.e.  official  development  finance (ODF)  as  commonly called,
innlude: (a) official grants;  (b) concessional loans from either bilateral or
multilateral sourceo,  and (c)  non-concessional  loans  from  bilateral,  multilateral
sources,  or  export credit  agencies. official development  assistance (ODA)  refers
to the sum of official grants and concessional loans.  Private flows  encompass:
(a) commercial bank loans; (b)  foreign direct investment (FDI), and;  (c) other
private flows such as portfolio investment.
Aggregate net resource flows  to developing countries as a whole reached an
estimated $71  billion in 1990,  a 12% increase  over 1989, but still lower  than $83
billion recorded in 1980.  The estimated increase is  attributed to the increased
net  lending from official  sources, much  of which went to  Severely  Indebted
Middle-Income Countries (SIMICS)  to  purchase collateral  or  buy-back debt in  Brady
Initiative operations.  Total private lending, net of amortization, has become
negligible compared with the levels of the 1970s and early 1980s.  FDI in 1990
surged  upwards due in part to the growth of  debt-equity swap programs [see  Table
A.1 on Aggregate Net Resource Flows).
The composition of external  flows to developing  countries has  changed
dramatically  in  the  1980s.  Official  grants  (28%), official  loans  net  of
3amortization (39%),  and foreign  direct investment (31%)  accounted for almost  the
whole of aggregate net flows 'n 1990, as has been the case since 1987.  This
represents a ma3or shift from the dominance of commercial bank Lending in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, and a return to the pattern of net flows prevailing
in the 1960s and eaLly 1970s.  The composition of the official flows also has
shifted.  Official  grants and concessional  lending  (ODA) have  grown, while
nonconcessional, bilateral official lending  has  declined markedly, compared with
the early 1980s.  The share of multilateral lending has increased relative to
bilateral lending.
The record of the  1980s shows that the total  ODA  flows have  remained
stagnant in real terms.  ODA flows from DAC have i.ncreased  in volume terms but
declined in relation to CDP from  0.36% in 1980  to 0.33% in 1989.  Non-DAC ODA has
fallen  more drastically during this period as assistance from the CMEA and OPEC
donors has declined from the 1980 level.
The shift in the composition of aggregate net flows and private lenders'
interest in supporting private sector projects means that in some countries the
public sector now has leas access to external private  funds than the private
sector, a  major change compared with the late 1S70s and early 1980s.  This shift
also means that  countries that relied on external borrowing from commercial
sources have suffered a sharp fall in  access to external resources compared  with
countries that can attract FDI.
The  total amount  of FDI flows  to developing countries declined in  the first
half  of the 1980s,  then increased  thereafter in  both nominal and real terms.  The
decline during the  first half of the decade may have been accounted  for by
several reasons: declining real GNP growth in a number of developing countries,
falling  domestic  investment,  increased  domestic  imbalances  and  lose  of
4international  liquidity  that  adversely  affected  investors'  confidence,  and
worsening  creditworthiness because of debt-service difficulties.  During the
second half of the decade  some of these inhibiting factors were raversed. A
number of developing countries that have undertaken macroeconomic adjustment
showed  improved  economic  performance,  particularly  in  Latin  America.  In
particular, FDI flows  to Mexico and Chile have surged as progress has been made
to  stabilize, liberalize  trade,  restructure  and  privatize  public  enterprises, and
attract foreign investors to export zones.
Many  developing  countries  were  also  able  to  attract  FDI  flows  in
conjunction  with  their debt-equity  conversion programs.  The  r  .. al  level of
international  interest  rates fell  sharply,  increasing  the relative  attractiveness
to investors of direct investment.  However, difficult economic prospects of
developing countries  as a whole made  industrial countries a relatively more
attractive dostination for direct investment.  As a consequence, the share of
developing countries in  the total FDI flows worldwide fell from 20% in the early
19808 to 11% by the eiid  of the decade (see  Table A.2 on FDI Flows].
While FDI has become a dominant source of private  flows to developing
economies, it has been thus far highly concentrated.  Asia has been the most
successful region in attracting and maintaining FDI flows.  The experies.ce  may
be attributed to the comparative success of many countries in the region in
avoiding high inflation and  high levels  of external  debt, to  maintaining skilled,
motivated  and  cost-efficient  labor  and to  liberalization of  the  investment
regime.
2.  External Flows To  South Asian Countries
Aggregate  net flows to South Asian countriea as a group has increased
steadily since the mid-1980s, reaching $9.3  billion in 1989, compared with $1.3
5billion  in 1970 and $5.8 billion  in 1980, respectively.  During the  1980.,
however, the growth pattern of various sources of external fltwa shows a marked
difference.  Whili the region's reliance on offic.al flows is still great, the
share  of concossional ODA in  the total resource flows has declined from 80.7% in
1980  to 54.3% in  1989.  Offsetting this  decline was a significant increase in  the
share of  private  flows.  India  and  Pakistan  resorted  to  attracting  foreign
exchange deposits from their non-reside.ts. India also expanded its commercial
bank and bond financing.  FDI remains an insignificant source of capital flows  to
these countries (see  Table A.3 on Net Resource Flows to South Asia).
Bangladesh.  The country is heavily dependent on foreign  capital for it.
investment. Some 70 percent of gross domestic investment is still financed from
external resources, despite the fact that the level of these flows has remained
stagnant  and  has  declined  in real  terms.  Concessional  official  flows  from
bilateral and  multilateral sources  are the mainstay of the country's development
finance.  The ratio  of aggregate resource f'ows  to GNP has  declined over time, but
the low level of domestic savings means that external resources would continue
to play  an important role in the country's domestic prcouction and economic
growth.
India.  From the low levels  of the early 1980s the country received steady
increases in external resources, reaching about $5 billion in 1989, an increase
of two and a half times the 1980 level.  This increase was due to an expansion
in commercial bank credits, non-resident deposits and new bond issues, despite
generally  unfavorable market  conditions  for developing  countries  during the
period.  Contribution of  external flows  to  domestic production and investment  has
increased during the last  decade: total external resource flows  to GDP ratio has
gone up from 1.2% in 1980 to 2.0% in 1989, and total resource flows to GDI ratio
6increased from 5.3% to 805% for the same period.  The share of concessional ODA
fell markedly:  the ratic of concessional ODA to total resource flows was  70
percent in 1980, and dropped to only 32 percent in 1989.  One unusual aspect of
capital flows to India has been that FDI flows to the country remained low.
Pakistan.  Long-term  external flows  to  Pakistan have  been stagnant for  most
of the 1980., although the 1989 figure of $1.6 billion was the highest level
achieved during the 1980s in nominal terms.  Closer scrutiny of annual flows
reveals an usually high  degree of volatility, attributable to wide variations in
bi.ateral concessional  loans,  multilateral non-concessional  loans,  and  commercial
bank loans.  However, FDI flows, although at a very low level, have shown a
steady growth since  the early 1980s, reaching $200  million in 1989, three times
higher than the level recorded in 1980.  During the last decade Pakistan has
become less dependent upon concessional ODA.  Not only was the absolute amount
of ODA (in  nominal terms) in 1989 lower  than that in  1980, but its share of  total
resource flows declined substantially to below 50% in 1989, from 75 percent in
the beginning of  the 1980s. In  addition,  commercial  bank lending has  been erratic
and varied from $480  million in 1982 to negative flows exeeding $100 million in
1988. Ratios of total resource flows to GDP and GDI have declined during the
1980s, mirroring  the  increase in  national  savings  brought  about by  rising
workers' remittances from abroad.
Sri Lanka.  Total net inflows to the country have not grown during the
recent decade,  and they actually fell since the peak of  1982.  Considerable
declines  in  all major  components  of  private  flows more  than  offset  steady
increases in  official flows.  In fact,  net  private flows  have  been negative since
1987, reflecting diminishing new lending by commercial banks.  During the course
of the 1980s Sri Lanka has become more reliant on  ODA: share of concessional ODA
7in total resource flows has increased from 71%-in  1980 to 96% in 1989.  The
stagnant capital flows to the country also resulted in a lower contribution of
external capital to the domestic economy, as reflected in declining ratios of
total resouro- flows to GDP and GDI.
3.  External Flows to ASEAN Countries
Annual aggregate net flows to ASEAN developing countries (i.e. excluding
Singapore) varied widely during the 1980s, ranging from less than $4 billion in
1987-88 to more than $12 billion in 1983.  This gyration was attributable to
fluctuating flows from private sources, especially commercial banks and bond
issues.  The most noticeable trend in capital flows to dynamic ASEAN economies
was steady and strong  growth in FDI, amounting to $4.8  billion in 1989 (compared
with $1.2  billion in 1980; and accounting for  almost all of the private flows to
the region in  the recent years.  Substantial preoayments by some  ASEAN countries
also  contributed  to  the  contraction  of  private  flows  in  1987-88.  The
contribution of other types of external capital inflows to domestic economic
activity is  declining gradually although official flows are still important for
Indonesia and the Philippines  (see Table A.4 on Net Resource  Flows to ASEAN
Countries].
Indonesia.  significant growth was registered in official flows to the
country during the 1980s.  Virtually all components of official flows expanded,
and r"altilateral  non-concessional loans experienced the fastest growth.  Like
many  other  countries,  private  flows  showed  considerable  year-by-year
fluc.uations, mainly because oL  wide variations in the amount of loans from
comm,rcial sources.  FDI flows to Indonesia, however, have grown exceptionally
fast and more than quadrupled during the last decade.
Malaysia.  From the 1982 peak of $5.3 billion, capital flows to Malaysia
8have shown a  decli.aing  trend, reaching $1.2  billion in 19°9.  This trend has  been
reinforced by iteadily  aclining official flows  and large  drops in  private loans
due  to substantial  prepaymsnts in some  years.  FDI is  the  only source  of external
flows that is significant and expandirg. In fact, aggregate net flows excluding
FDI were nagative for  the last  three years  of the 1980s.  The  decline in external
capital  flown was  attributable,  in part, to  improvements  in gross  domestic
savings.
Philippines.  Unlike other ASEAN countries, the Philippine economy has
suffered since the onset of the debt crisis.  Voluntary new private  flows,
pending the Brady Initiative c-  oration, have dried up in recent years, and thus
the country has become increasingly  dependent upon official flows.  For example,
the share of concessional ODA in  total resource flows has gcne up substantially
from 12% in 1980 to 58% in 1989.  For the three years ending 1989 the total net
private flows  were negative, despite large  increases in FDI flows  to the country
during that period.
Thailand.  The sound  macroeconomic performance  helped  improve  the  country's
access  to international  capital  markets and  enhanced its  attractiveness as  an FDI
destination.  The great  majority of resource flows has come from  private sources
during  the  1980s,  and  data  for  the  most  recent  year  indicate  a  cleaL
intensification of this trend. FDI has increased dramatically, from a $200-300
million level during early to mid-1980s to $1.7  billion in 1989,  reflecting more
than  anything  else  economic  and political  stability maintained  through  the
period.  The official non-concessional flows turned negative as the country's
improved  current  account  prorpted  prepayments  of  loans  from  multilateral
institutions.
94.  External  Debt  .3urden
Unlike Africa and Latin America, Asian countries both in ASEAN and South
Asia have been able to avoid  external debt difficulties. Except the Philippines,
no  other  country  in the  region  falls in the  category of  severely  indebted
countries. The debt indicators  have, by and large, remained mana aable although
those for Indonesia and Pakistan signify a larger burden than others [see Table
A.5;. In both these cases, however, new money flows at appropriate terms mainly
from official multilateral and bilateral sources have offset the outflows on
account of debt service obligations. Both  these countries have received positive
aggregate net transfers.
There  are  are  several  reasons that  explain why  Asia  (except for the
Philippines) largely escaped the debt crisis of the 1980s.  First, most of them
pursued stable and prudent macroeconomic policies during this period, although
they followed  different development  strategies. Second, export  growth rates
exceeded  the growth in  debt and  debt service  particularly in  the ASEAN sub-group.
Third, the ratio of concessional debt to total debt was relatively high (except
in the  cases of  Malaysia  and Thailand) but  more pronounced  in South Asian
countries.  Fourth,  the  share  of  variable  interest  rate  in  total  debt  was
comparatively lower than ttle  Latin American countries, and thus the rise in
interest  rates  did not  result in immediate  difficulties [see  Table A.6]. Finally,
these courtries did not resort  to short-term  borrowing at any significant level.
III.  ROLE  OF  EXTERNAL  CAPITAL  IN DEVELOPMENT  AND  DETERMINANTS  OF  PRIVATE
CAPITAL  FLOWS
1.  Theoretical Con.iiierations
The role  of foreign capital in economic  growth of developing countries has
10been  an  important and controversial subject.  Prevalent theories during  the
1950u-60s were that external capital flows  would have positive effects on  growth
under the assumption that all capital inflows constitute net additions to the
capital-importing  developing country's  productive resources  without substituting
for  domestic savings or affecting incremental capital-output  ratio.  Alternative
theories advanced  in the early  1970s, however, argued that optimal resource
allocation  implied by plausible  utility  functions would  lead to at  least a
partial allocation of additional resources to present consumption.1 Previous
empirical findings generally suggest a negative relationship between  foreign
capital inflows  and  domestic savings,  but  with the coefficient  of foreign  capital
far less than unity (in  absolute value), implying  that domestic savings  would be
only partially crowded out by foreign capital infusion.
It has been  suggested, for instance, that the  availabi.Lity  of general
purpose external commercial finance, although in response to oil price shocks,
reinforced the negative savings effect during the 1970s.  Kharas and Levinson's
r1985J2  empirical analysis of this hypothesis, covering twenty-six developing
countries for  1961-82,  confirms  that foreign  borrowing did  reduce domestic  saving
on the margin but there was no evidence that shifts in sources and patterns of
foreign financing altered country behavior.  From a macroeconomic viewpoint,
foreign funds were sufficiently fungible with domestic resources so that their
impact on domestic investment and consumption remained minimal.
External finance or borrowing in the context of developing countries is
primarily viewed as a source of increased resources for investment to generate
I  For  a  review  of  these literatures,  see Lee,  Rana,  and  Iwasaki,  'Effects  of  Foreign  Capital Flows  on
Developing  Countries  of Asia," ADB Economic  Staff Paper No.30, April 1986.
2  Kharas, H. and Levinson,  "Savings  Rates and Debt Crisis," World  Bank CPD Discussion  Paser No. 1985-
47, October 1985.
11growth  relaxing  the  constraints  of  domestic  savings  and  foreign  exchange.  As  the
marginal  productivity  of investment  in  capital-scarce  countries  is believed  to
be higher  than the global  real interest  rate,  it is surmised  that developing
countries  should  borrow  from  international  capital  markets  and  use  borrowings  to
increase  investment  and  output  growth  rates.
2.  Macroeconomic  Factors  Affecting  Growth  and Private  Capital  Flows:
Some  Empirical  Evidence
In their  seminal  paper  on international  capital  mobility,  Feldstein  and
Horioka  [19803  examined  the  extent  to which  international  capital  flows  depend
on domestic  savings  rates  in OECD countries,  and  thereby  tested  the  degree  of
capital  mobility  as  a function  of  yield  differentials.  The  statistical  results
they obtained  generally  suggested  that capital  mobility  across  countries  was
imperfect,  and  increases in domestic savings were reflected primarily in
additional  domestic  investments.  An important  implication  of  this  study  is  that
countries  which face such limitations  in the capital  mobility  would have to
consider  non-market  policy factors  to facilitate  long-term  external  capital
flows. Therefore,  we first  replicate  the  Feldstein-Horioka  regression  equation
to  investigate  how  responsive  international  private  capital  flows  are  to  domestic
savings  rates  in South  Asia and  ASEAN  countries  and  whether  major implications
of Feldstein  and  Horioka's  study  are  applicable  to these  developing  countries.
The regression  takes  the following  simple  form:
(I/Y)i =  a +  b (S/Y)i,  (1)
where (I/Y)i  is the  ratio  of gross  domestic  investment  to GDP in country  i and
(S/Y)i  is  the corresponding  ratio  of  gross  domestic  savings  to GDP.  Since  the
3  Feldstein,  M. and C. Horioka, 'Domestic  Savings  and Intemational  Capital  Flows,  "The Econoniic  Joumal,
90, June 1980.
12excess of gross domestic investment  over gross domestic savings is equal to the
net inflow  of foreign  investment, a regression of the ratio of net  foreign
investment inflow to GDP on the domestic  avings ratio would have a coefficient
of (b - l).  Therefore, testing the hypothesis that b equals one is equivalent
to testing the hypothesis that the international capital flows do not depend on
domestic savings rates.  By  using average  ratios for  the sample  period 1968-1988,
regression  results,  as  well  as  summary  variables,  for  nine  countries  --
Bangladesh,  India,  Nepal,  Pakistan,  Sri  Lanka,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  The
Philippines, and Thailand --  are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of Input  Variables and Parameter Estimates
Country  Mean (S/GDP)  Mean (I/GDP)
Bangladesh  0.031  0.114
India  0.195  0.211
Nepal  0.087  0.145
Pakistan  0.090  0.172
Sri Lanka  0.130  0.213
Indonesia  0.250  0.227
Malaysia  0.307  0.271
Philippines  0.210  0.234
Thailand  0.221  0.255
Mean  0.169  0.205
Standard deviation  0.089  0.052
Regression
Intercept (a)  Coefficient (b)
Parameter Estimates  0.113  0.541
(t-statistics)  (7.944)  (7.178)
R-square (adjusted)  =  0.863
Note: The results are based on a sample period of 1968-88.
As one might expect, the average gross savings ratio  (0.169) for South
Asian and ASEAN countries is found to be lower than the OECD figure  (0.250)
13reported by Feldstein and  Horioka.  Likewise, developing countries in  the region
had, on aver&ge, a lower investment  ratio (0.205),  compared with the OECD figure
(0.254). The estimate of b in the regression equition is  0.5';  (S.E.=  0.075) and
its t-statistics is significant at the 0.01 level. 4 The result indicates that
investment  yield differential is insufficient  for  international capital mobility
in these countries, the normative implication being that there are non-market
factors that are important in facilitating capital inflows to them.
To gain further insight about the effects of external capital inflows on
the economies of the region, we adopt an empirical methodology developed by Lee,
Rana and Iwasaki 11986]. We consider the following  simultaneous equation model,
devised to eliminate specification bias resulting from the simultaneity between
growth rate and domestic savings rate.  The model consists of a growth equation
and a savings equation, where the former is the traditional export-augmented
neoclassical production function and the latter the traditional Keynesian-type
saving function augmented by several variables. 5
G =  al +  bl-OF +  b2-PF +  b3-S +  b4-X +  bS-L +  e  (2)
S =  a2 +  b6.OF +  b7-PF +  bS-X +  b9-GDP +  blO-G +  u  (3)
where G =  growth rate of GDP, OF =  official flows as  percentage of GDP, PF =  FDI
as percentage of GDP, S =  gross domestic saving as percentage of GDP, X =  change
in export as percentage of GDP, L =  growth rate of labor force, GDP =  GDP per
4  The estimate  of regression  coefficient  is lower than 0.889 for OECD countries for the 1960-74  period,
which was reported  in the Feldstein-Horioka  paper.
5  Explanatory  variables  are defined  slightly  differently  from Lee, et al, ibid,  and other  plivious studies. The
variable  PF in this study measures  FDI flows only, rather  broader private  flows, to examine  more clearly  the effect
of FDI on domestic  economy.
14capita,  and  e  and  u  - error  terms. 6
The  regression  model  that  includes  two  endogenous  variables  and  f ive
exogenous  variables  is  tested  in  two  stages:  first  the  reduced  form  of  the  model
to  test  the  total  effects,  and  then  the  structural  equation  of  the  model  to  test
direct  effects.  Table  2  reports  regression  results  of  the  reduced  form  equation
based  on  pooled  cross-section  and  time-series  annual  data  for  the  nine  countries
1isted  in  the  Table  1  during  the  sample  period  of  1970-88.7
Table  2.  Regression  Estimates:  Aggregate  Data
Endogenous  Exoaenous  Variable
Variable  Intercept  OF  PF  X  L  GDP  MSE
Growth  rate  0.036  -0.084  0.923  0.300  0.349  -0.000  0.035
(2.351)1  (-0.819)  (2.545)1  (3.958)1  (0.636)(-1.627)
Savings  rate  0.251  -1.749  0.813  0.644  -3.261  0.000  0.048
(11.787)2  (-12.186)2  (1.606)  (6.085)2(-4.250)2(4.782)2
Adjusted  R-square  (F-statistics  in  the  parentheses):
Growth  equation  =  0.124  (5.810)
Savings  equation  =  0.740  (97.817)
Note:  Asymptotic  t-statistics  are  in  the  parentheses.
1  significant  at  0.05  level.
2  significant  at  0.01  level.
Sample  period:  1970-88.
6  It is noted that  the coefficients  of the reduced  form equation  of the model  are composites  of the coefficients
in Equations (2) and (3).  Since the simultaneous  equation system is fully determined. the estimates of the
coefficients  in Equations  (2) and (3) can be derived from the composite  coefficients. For the specificationof  the
reduced form equation  and the justification  for the selection  of explanatory  variables,  see Lee, et al, pp. 18-19.
7  The pooling  procedure  could be problematic  for countries  that are heterogeneous  in terms of economic  and
social characteristics. To cope with this drawback, therefore, we also tested the regression model for two sub-
groups of countries; South  Asian and ASEAN.
15Empirical results from the growth equation suggest that economic growth
in  the region has been most significantly related to exports and foreign direct
investment.  Both  parameter estimates are positive and statistically significant
(both at the 0.05 level).  It is also interesting that domestic savings in the
region as a group have been strongly negatively associated with capital flows
from  official  sources,  but  somewhat  positively,  albeit  statistically
insignificant, related to FD  component of capital flows.
Table 3. Regression Estimates:  ASEAN Countries
Endogenous  Exogenous Variable
Variable  Intercept  OF  PF  X  L  GDP  MSE
Growth rate  0.050  0.022  0.951  0.257  0.096  -0.000  0.030
(1.835)  (0.050)  (2.952)1 (3.452)1  (0.098)  (-2.526)
Savings rate  0.250  -2.058  0.527  0.471  -1.174  0.000
(7.100)2  (-3.618)1  (1.261)  (4.873)2 (-0.920)  (2.966)1
Adjusted R-square (F-statistics in the parentheses):
Growth equation - 0.199 (4.719)
Saving equation =  0.527 (17.714)
Note:  Asymptotic t-statistics are in the parentheses.
1 significant at 0.05 level.
2 significant at 0.01 level.
Sample period: 1970-88.
Since  economic  and  social  characteristics  in  South  Asian  and  ASEAN
countries are not homogeneous, we also ran the regression for the two different
groups  of countries.  Results, which  are reported  in Tables  3 and  4, were
substantially  different  in  terms  of  significance  of  individual  exogenous
16variable. and explanatory power of the model.  For example, the while effect of
FDI on growth waa positive and statistically significant in ASEAN countries, it
was insignificant for South Asian countries.  Official flows were found to be
an insignificant explanatory variable for growth: the coefficient was positive
for the two  country groups,  but  it was  statistically  insignificant  in both
cases. 8
Table 4. Regression Estimates:  South Asian countries
Endogenous  Exogenous Variable
Variable  InterceDt  OF  PF  X  L  GDP  MSE
Growth rate  -0.011  0.011  -0.595  0.288  0.868  0.000  0.038
(-0.396)  (0.073) (-0.325)  (1.342)  (1.151)  (2.190)
Savings rate  0.258  -1.353  -1.256  0.403  -4.662  0.000
(8.469)2  (-7.659)2  (-0.598) (1.637)  (-5.388)2  (1.337)
Adjusted R-square (F-statistics in the parentheses):
Growth equation = 0.052 (1.823)
Saving equation =  0.611 (24.528)
Note:  Asymptotic t-statistics are in the parentheses.
1 significant at 0.05 level.
2 significant at 0.01 level.
Sample period: 1970-88.
It is also interesting to note that domestic savings in the two country
groups  were  negatively  related to  official  flows and the  coefficients were
8  Empirical testing was also performed on altemative data specification, e.g.  three-year moving averages to
adjust for annual fluctuation and lagged relationships. While we obtained different parameter estimates, the
significance  of FDI was robust (in fact, even greater with the three-year  averages)  in terms of data specification,
and official flows were consistently  insignificant. In order to manifest  true relationship  between  these variables,
a causality  test should be useful.  More refined  empirical  analysis  of this subject, including  causality  test by using
Box-Jenkins  ARIMA  models, are left for our future research.
17significant statistically.  In contrast, FDI was found to be an insiginficant
factor in explaining savings rates.
The  above  results  confirm the earlier  evidence  that  foreign  capital
inflows have made a positive contribution to economic growth in the South Asian
and ASEAN countries. Table A.7 shows that GDP and exports have increased at a
rapid rate in ASEAN-4 during the last 25 years, while South  Asian countries also
registered modest rates of growth. The efficiency of investment as caps  ed by
the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR)  was also higher in  ASEAN as f.  ... pared
to South  Asian countries. 9 It is interesting  to note that the level  of net flows
to  ASEAN-4 in  the 1980s  was consistently  higher than that  of South Asia, although
the latter started with an initial  advantage in 1970.  While FDI has contributed
to growth both by augmenting resources available for capital formation and by
improving  the efficiency of investments, foreign aid  may have been used, in some
instances, to finance projects which were unnecessarily capital intensive.  As
was the case in  Lee, et al,  our study  also found  that, in  relative terms, FDI and
export performance contributed more to economic growth than aid, supporting the
view  that  developing countries  should  adopt  policies based  predominantly on  well-
functioning market mechanisms rather than rely on foreign aid for the bulk of
their development assistance.
Rapid growth in intra-Asian trade, particularly trade between the newly
induezrializing economies (NIEs)  and South East Asia, and Japan and NIEs, Japan
and  South  East  Asia  has  been  accompanied  by  rising  iDI.10 In  1988  Asian
investors accounted for 64  percent of total FDI approved by ASEAN.  Approvals of
9  Previous  empirical  studies  showed  that  foreign  direct  investment  made  a positive  contribution  in  augmenting
ICOR, whereas foreign aid tended to have a negative impact  on ICOR, See Lee, et al, ibid.
'°  Rana and Dowling, "Foreign  Capital  and Asian Economic  Growth", Asian  Development  Review, 1990,
Vol 8, No. 2.
18Japanese investment in Thailand, Philippines, increased by  over 200  percent, and
by over 100 percent in Malaysia. Among the NIEs, Hong Kong and Taiwan have been
the leaders in promoting FDI.
The  process  of  rapid  growth  in  output  and  intra-regional trade  and
investment  in Asia  is sometimes  referred  to  as a  "virtuous  circle"  of economic
development.  Foreign capital inflows have combined with  a favorable policy
environment, industrialization and  trade expansion.  Most Asian countries avoided
external debt crises in the first half of the 1980s despite the exposure of the
trade-dependent Asian countries to the external shocks of the preceding decade.
Policy ir.plications  of this virtuous circle of economic development for South
Asia are traced in the next section.
IV.  PROSPECTS FOR RESOURCE FLOWS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The economic outlook for  developing couintries  in general  appears fuzzy as
a result of external uncertainties they face.  First, the rate of growth of the
industrial countries in  the 1990s,  and thus the growth of  markets for developing
country exports, is expected to slow down. Second, world  interest rates and
exchange rate movements are beset with uncertainty.  Non-dollar interest rates
have risen sharply. At the same time the dollar has depreciated against other
major currencies.
In addition to uncertainties about the international trading environment
and the cost of external finance, developing  countries have to confront the
uncertainty surrounding the availability of external finance.
External finance availability for developing countries will continue to
remain difficult. It is  projected that net flows  will increase at 8 to 9  percent
a year on average in 1990-95, slightly faster than the nominal growth rate of
19industrial countries. But, because of the larger stock of developing country
debt, relatively high real interest rates, and rising remittances from profits
on the growing stock  of foreign  direct investment, aggregate net transfers would
be only slightly positive by 1995 [see Table A.8 on Projected Net Flows).
We estimate, on a conservative basis, that aggregate net flows in 1995
will be around $117 billion and support a current account deficit of about $70
billion or 1.6 percent of GDP of developing couz.cries.
The composition of flows in the 1990s could revert to what it  was in the
1960s --  with official flows and FDI assuming greater importance, and private
commercial lending  remaining limited.  Both bilateral and  multilateral lending in
the first half of the decade are expected to grow ahead of the GNP of industrial
countries.
It is more difficult to project financial flows to developing countries
from private sources.  However, two important factors would suggest that it is
likely to remain modest in the 1990s.  First, international banks and capital
markets are unlikely to consider most developing countries creditworthy unless
there is compelling evidence over a fairly long period of a strong external
payments situation and stable economic policies.  Second, the recent erosion in
the capital base of Japanese and U.S. commercial  banks will inhibit bank lending
to developing countries in the short term, but even when the capital base of
these banks is restored, it is likely that domestic borrowers will be given
preference over developing country clients.1 1
Finally, the projections on financial flows show steady growth  in FDI
through the 1990s.  But this is especially uncertain because much will depend on
"  See Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries,  p. 39, IEC, The World Bank (May 1991).
20developing country  policies.  The growing  use of  portfolio investments could  also
generate '.nterest  among large savers in industrial countries.
Among the Asian countries, China and ASEAN-4 are expected to meet their
external financing requirements  without much difficulty, if  the pattern of their
economic performance is similar to that achieved in the 1980s.  There are some
questions about the level and type of resources flows to South Asia.
South Asia improved its  economic performance in  the 1980B compared to the
earlier three decades.  The adjustment to external shocks was  managed reasonably
well.  Per capita income  and consumption growth rates  were higher.  Inflation  was
kept under control.  Trade imbalances  were  moderate.  A large  middle-income group
has emerged in all  these couitries and the proportion of population living  below
the poverty line has declined.
Despite these accomplishments,  the development agenda for  the South Asian
countries in  the 1990s  has  become more onerous.  While the emergence of a growing
and large  middle class has dispersed the benefits of growth to some extent, the
rising expectations of this middle class coupled with the goal of mitigating
absolute poverty among more than one billion people in the subcontinent have
intensified pressures to make difficult policy choices.
There are  three  major concerns that  temper an  optimistic  outlook for South
Asia in  this decade.  First, the commitment  to and  therefore the  pace of  economic
reform has been erratic, delaying the introduction of measures expected to make
the economies more diversified, flexible  and responsive to  external shocks.  The
recent experience  of the MiddLe  East crisis showed  that  while the ASEAN countries
(with  the exception of the Philippines) were able to adjust rapidly, the impact
on  all  the  four  South  Asian  countries  was  quite  adverse.  Efficiency,
productivity  and  competitiveness  in  these  countries  need  considerable
21improvement. Protection  of manufacturing  industries continues to  be high  in
Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.  Pricing of capital and labor remain highly
distorted in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Attempts at deregulation and
privatization have been sporadic.  The anti-export bias has not been reduced
significantly. Direct government  controls and  interventions in  price setting  are
still rampant.  The credit ratings of both India and Pakistan, which had access
to international financial markets in the 1980s, have been downgraded recently
by private  rating agencies.  It is also not obvious that private  transfers
(workers'  remittances), a significant source  of external financial resources for
South Asia during the 1980s, can be relied upon as a stable form of financing in
any future projections.
Policies  that  reward  cost  reduction  and  technical  change  and  place
pressures on domestic manufacturing to bring about such change would have to be
implemented.  Protected markets make enterprises soft and encourage obsolete
technologies.  Y. K. Alagh refers to a study of the Indian tire industry for the
1981-84 period where price  increases were  higher than  increases in material
costs,  and  the  top  four  companies  consistently  maintained  their  share  of
production, while the technology used was obsolete.
Second, fiscal  imbalances  are  becoming a  matter of  growing concern as  they
are being financed by internal and external borrowing which is unsustainable in
the  medium term.  Public  expenditures grew  much faster  than  revenues and  widening
fiscal deficits have been financed by internal borrowing and limited external
borrowing. According to one recent estimate, public sector bearer  bonds and
certificates  issued  in Pakistan  equalled Rs.  100 billion,  while  the  total
currency in circulation was Rs. 135 billion.  Interest payments are growing and
amounted to Rs. 47 billion, or 30 percent of the current expenditure in last
22fiscal year.  Similarly in India, interest  payments have been rising and take up
almost  one-fourth  of  the  governmei.t  expenditure.  Problems  in  the  heavily
indebted countries  (HICs) are exacerbated precisely because  of large public
sector  deficits  which  were  financed  through  monetary  expansion  and  large
borrowinj.  The South Asian countries should learn from  the lessons of the HIre
and take steps to contain their fiscal imbalances.
Third, among its sources of external finance, the South Asian countries
have traditionally  relied  heavily  upon  official  b lateral  and multilateral
concessional assistance, supplemented by workers' remittances.  But in recent
years  there  has  been  a  marked  shift  toward  short-term  debt  (non-resident
deposits)  and  commercial borrowing.  The growth  potential  and  structure of
exports of goods and services  is neither adequately robust nor sufficiently
buoyant to support this type of financing, at least in the next few years. The
vulnerability to external shocks such as the Middle East crisis is also high.
On a more general level, the factors that stimulated large scale lending
by commercial banks in  the 1970s  are unlikely  to repeat  themselves.  The negative
real rates of interest, the shift in world savings to oil exporting countries
(that did not have a high short-term domestic abscrptive capacity) and undue
emphasis on "physical  capital" (to  the exclusion of human capital, policy regime
and institutional capacity) enabled about fifty  developing countries to attract
commercial bank lending in that period.  The commercial banks have become more
cautious and selective in providing general obligation financing to developing
countries. It  is  unlikely  that tne  South  Asian countries  will attract significant
resources from commercial sources.
Competition is also keen for limited  ODA funds.  There is a feeling  among
several  donor governments that at least  India and  Pakistan  should  not receive the
23same  level  of concessional  bilateral  assistance  funds  as they have  received  in
the past.  The only viable source  of financing  that has not been seriously
exploited  by South  Asia is FDI.
Foreign direct investment  flows have become an important source of
capital,  technology  and  exports  among  the  ASEAN  countries.  South  Asian  countries
have not benefitted  from these flows so far, because  of severe  restrictions
placed  by governments. Governments'  concerns  with FDI include  the political
implications  of foreign  control  over domestic  resources,  the  transfer  pricing
mechanism  and  the  appropriateness  of  the  transferred  technology.  Nationalistic
sentiment  against  ownership  and  control  by foreigners  also  places  psychological
barriers  against  FDI flows.
The  recent  evidence  and  experience  of East  Asian  countries  suggests  that
the benefits of FDI outweigh .,oth  the real and perceived costs, and the
competition  among  developing  countries  (including  Eastern  Europe)  to  attract  FDI
has  become  more intense. The challenge  for  South  Asian  governments  is not  to
restrict  these  flows  but  to  attract  these  flows,  maximizing  their  positive  impact
and controlling  adverse  effects.
A recent  study 12  shows  that  the liberalization  of restrictions  on FDI
can generate  positive  direct  and indirect  effects  on income  and welfare in
developing  countries.  Foreign  capital  inflows  stimulate  specialization  and  raise
the  productivity  of the  industry  that  uses  them. The  impact  of foreign  capital
occurs  through  two  mechanisms:  a relative  factor  price  effect  and  an extent  of
the  market  effect. A capital  inflow  lowers  the  economy's  rental  rate,  reducing
the  fixed  cost  of  setting-up  and  operating  new  services  and  stimulating  entry  of
12  F. L. Rivera-Batiz  and L. A. Rivera-Batiz,  The Effects of Direct Foreign Investment  in the Presence of
Increasing  Returns due to Specialization,  34, Journal of Development  Economics,  November, 1990.
24firms into that sector.  The.  extent of the market effect, on the other hand,
indicates that, at given relative factor prices, capital inflows induce entry
into  the  service  sector  by  augmentinq  industrial  output.  Both  of  these
mechanisms  act to  raise  industrial productivity  and in  fact, work  to raise
national welfare.  Foreign capital inflows could be considered to be the result
of the elimination of barriers to foreign investment in LDCs.
In comparing the financial attributes of FDI to those of borrowing from
commercial sources, FDI is taought to possess four advantages. 13  First, equity
financing requires payments only when che investment earns a profit while debt
requires repayments irrespective of the economic, and particularly the balance
of payments situation of the developing countries.  Second, payments on FDI can
be regulated by the host country while debt repayments are outside its control
as they are affected by interest rates set in  the international market.  Third,
because much  of  FDI consists of reinvested earnings, only a portion of the
returns on investment typically is repatriated, as opposed to the need to repay
interest and principal on loans.  This reinvestment involves lesser constraints
and has an almost built-in rollover mechanism compared with the fluctuations in
commercial  bank lending. Fourth, FDI  permits a closer  match between the  maturity
structures of the earnings from an investment and that of the required payments
to the capital used to  finance it, thus avoiding the mismatch  created when
developing countries borrow short-term to finance long-term investments.
In  examining the advantages  of FDI in  terms  of the  variability of payments
resulting from it, it is well to remember that the "payments" involve in large
part reinvested  earnings which  have no  impact on the  short-term demand  for
3  Michalopoulos,  C.,  "Private  Direct  Investment,  Finance  and Development,"  Asian  Development  Review,
Vol 3, No. 2, 1985.
25foreign exchange.  In practice, there is not as much variability in the actual
outflows of remittances as debt servicing but there is a lot of variability in
reinvested  earnings  which  have  little  bearing  on  the  short-term  financing
problems of developing countries.
Perhaps more important  than this  variability in earnings is  the fact  that
for  non-oil  developing  countries  the  actual  level  of  repatriated  earnings
relative to the stock of investment calculated on the basis of book value is
typically less than interest  payments relative to the stock of foreign debt.  In
1982  i.e., before the onset of the  debt crisis, the ratio was 3.8  percent for  FDI
compared with 8.3  percent for lending.  Even this ratio understates the relative
advantage  of  such  investment  since  the  book  value  of  assets  frequently
understates the real  value of  the investment. This means that in  the longer-term
less of the earnings on investment associated with FDI is "taken out" of the
country than with pure lending.
On balance, FDI has some important financial advantages over borrowing,
but these should not be exaggerated as a source of support for greater flows of
such investment in the future. In case of South Asia there are some additional
factors which favor foreign direct investment.  The cultural heritage of these
societies puts a  premium on acquisition of knowledge and education as desirable
objectives.  This attribute is conducive to the development of technology and
industry.  The assimilation and dissemination  of technological innovation  should
thus be relatively rapid and easier in South Asia compared to some developing
countries.
Second, the scope for absorbing FDI in these countries is  quite large, as
they start  with a relatively low  base.  The share  of FDI in  total financial flows
to South Asia has historically averaged 1 percent while the comparable figures
26for the NIEs are 32 percent and 16 percent for ASEAN countries. In the most
recent year, FDI accounted for 8 percent of total financial flows in South Asia
and 50 percent  for ASEAN  countries  [see Table  A.9 on Components of Capital
Flows). The  size of the domestic market  and the emergence of a growing  and
dynamic middle class with purchasing powers comparable to East Asian countries
are natural magnets for this type of investment.
Finally, the countries in this sub-region are endowed with relatively
cheap labor and a large  educated and skilled  manpower reservoir.  Of course, the
productivity is  relatively low  but  the  organizational  and  managerial improvements
that are implicit in the FDI should be able to make better use of these skills.
The external financial requirements of these countries in the 1990s are
still substantial.  Our preliminary estimates show that average annual inflows
of $14-$15 billion are required between 1991-99 to sustain a GDP growth rate of
4.6  percent  for  South Asia.  Of  this,  $4-4.3  billion  are  expected  private
remittances from  migrant  workers, $1.5-2  billion foreign  direct investment,  $1.5-
2  billion from international financial  markets, $3-3.5  billion from  multilateral
institutions, $1.5 billion as bilateral loans and $1 billion as official grants
[see  Table A.10 on Potential Sources of Flows to Asia].
The above estimates clearly indicate, in addition to attracting FDI and
opening  up  the  trade  regimes,  that  South  Asia  would  continue  to  rely  on
concessional assistance  from bilateral a:id  multilateral sources.  Given the
relatively good  economic record  of  these countries,  their  effectiveness in  proper
utilization of such  assistance in  past and the fact  that several hundred  million
people live below the poverty line in these countries, an adequate level of ODA
resources is essential to meet their financing needs.  ODA can also contribute
to improve the economic environment for FDI through investment in physical and
27human infrastructure  and strengthening the  institutional base  in developing
countries which, in turn, increases the profitability of FDI.
But a word of caution is necessary.
If FDI takes place in countries with high rates of effective protection
and economic rents accruing to producers are eignificant due to the various
distortions in the host country  economic policies, the net economic benefits are
likely to be modest, insignificant or even negative, depending on the magnitude
of  the distortions.  In  South  AsLan  countries, liberalization  of policies towards
FDI needs to be accompanied by a reduction in rates of effective protection and
the fostering of competition in domestic markets.  Otherwise, the opening up to
FDI by itself may not be beneficial.
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
A  comparison  of  two  sub-groups  of  countries  in  Asia  that  followed
different development  strategies --  ASEAN-4  and South Asia  --  reveals that
external capital flows have  made a positive contribution in fostering  growth and
improving living  standards in  both sets  of countries. Except for  the Philippines,
all  other countries avoided the debt crisis that characterized  Latin America and
Africa in the 1980s. The common thread in the two sub-groups was pursuit of
prudent and stable macroeconomic policies during the period  under review. Fiscal
imbalances in  South Asian  countries in  recent years  are,  however, creating severe
pressure and need to be effectively tackled.
Empirical analysis carried out in this paper and elsewhere also suggests
that careful consideration should be given to the type of capital flow.  The
various types of external flows can have different impact on domestic saving,
capital formation and long-term economic development, despite their financial
28'fungibility.  Foreign  direct  investment and  export  expansion  are  found to
contribute more to output growth than official aid flows through economy-wide
efficiency gains.  Official flows,  usually tied to specific projects and imports
of specific  goods and se:vices,  may in some  instances finance  activities that are
not socially profitable.
Beyond its role as a source of risk capital for investment, FDI can play
an important role in development by transferring new technology and business
practice, by stimulating innovation and investment in the host country through
its linkage  to domestic firms, and by securing access to international goods and
capital  markets. In  ASEAN countries,  where substantial inflows  are taking place,
FDI  has  been a  driving force in  the  expansion and  diversification of  manufactured
exports.  While  the  ASEAN-4  and  China  are  expected  to  meet  their  external
financing requirements in 1990s,  the prospects for increased  ODA and commercial
bank lending to South Asia do not appear promising although their requirements
would continue to be substantial. Official flows to this region are not likely
to grow faster  than in  the past, and they  may be directed to other regions facing
urgent needs. There will also be an increasing competition for private loans,
which would be reinforced by tightening inte'national credit and potential new
borrowings related to the Middle East crisis. Moreover, the capacity of South
Asian countries to borrow on market terms is also limited for the time being.
Considering the  comparative advantage  of  South  Asian  economies --  an  ample
supply of low wage skilled and educated labor --  countries in this region must
pursue more actively  policies that would attract FDI inflows.  There is  no simple
explanation of what policies attract FDI, but it is generally conceived that
macroeconomic  stability, a  stable exchange  rate regime,  a non-distortionary
incentive system (including  transparent tax policies), and legal and regulatory
29reforms are  important factors. Adequate domestic financing  and  external official
resources  would  have  to  be  mobilized  to  help  support  the  expansion  of
complementary infrastructure and social services that are essential to growing
FDI.
Finally, portfolio investment in the form of country or regional funds
offers another source of capital flows to the region in the 1990s.  In view of
the increasingly significant role that institutional investors play in cross-
border  investment, government  policies should  foster further  development  of
domestic capital markets through financial sector reforms.  Market liberalizing
measures recently envisaged by the governments of India and Pakistan must be
viewed as a move in the right direction.
30Table  Al. Financial  Flows  (Long-term)  to  Low-  and  Middle-Income  Countries.1980-90
(in  billions  of USS)
......................... …..................................
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990P
....................................
Aggregate  net  resource
ftovs  (long-term)  82.8  99.9  88.4  68.2  61.9  56.6  51.2  46.1  60.9  63.3  71.0
Official  development
finance  32.6  33.7  33.8  31.6  34.0  31.8  33.6  32.2  36.3  36.6  46.9
Official  grants  12.5  11.4  10.4  9.9  11.4  13.2  14.0  14.9  18.0  18.6  19.5
Official  loans  (net)  20.1  22.3  23.4  21.7  22.6  18.6  19.6  17.3  18.3  18.0  27.4
Bilateral  12.2  12.9  11.9  10.6  10.3  6.4  6.3  4.9  6.8  6.1  10.4
Multilateral  7.8  9.4  11.5  11.0  12.4  12.2  13.3  12.4  11.5  11.9  16.9
Private  loans  (net)  41.1  53.3  43.6  28.1  19.6  14.3  8.1  0.7  5.5  4.3  2.3
Commercial  banks  30.8  44.0  30.9  19.8  14.6  4.7  2.4  -1.1  0.7  3.0  ..
Bonds  1.1  1.3  4.8  1.0  0.3  5.0  1.3  0.2  2.2  0.3
Other  9.2  8.0  7.8  7.4  4.7  4.5  4.4  1.6  2.6  1.0
Foreign  direct
investment  (FOI)  9.1  12.9  11.1  8.5  8.3  10.5  9.5  13.2  19.1  22.4'  21.8
Aggregate net  transfers
(long-term)  37.0  45.7  27.4  10.5  -0.9  -7.4  -10.0  -16.8  -9.5  -1.0  9.3
Nemorandu  items:
Private  grants  2.3  2.0  2.3  2.3  2.6  2  9  3.3  3.5  4.2  4.2  4.3
Net  Use of  IMF Credit  3.9  6.9  6.6  11.1  4.4  -0.2  -2.5  -5.8  -5.5  -2.3  2.1
Notes  and Sources:  Country  coverage:  110  tow-  and middle-income  countries;  as  covered  in  World  Debt  Tables.
1990-91.  Loans:  DRS;  excludes  short-term  flows.  FDI:  IMF,  balance  of  payments  figures,  which  include  reinvested
profits.  Official  and private  grants:  OECD.  Aggregate  net transfers  equals  aggregate  net resource  flows  less
interest  payments  (DRS  basis)  and reinvested  and remitted  profits  (IMF).
p/ Projection.
e/  Estimate.
31Table  A2. Flows  of Foreign  Direct  Investment.  1981-90
(in  biLlions  of  USS)
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1¶90P
Met  flows
Developing  countries  tIBRD)  10.9  10.7  7.4  8.2  8.7  8.6  11.4  15.7  16.2  20.1
Africa  0.5  1.9  1.1  1.7  1.2  1.4  1.2  1.2  1.5  1.7
Asia  & Pacific  2.6  2.5  2.8  2.9  2.9  3.4  4.6  7.4  8.8  7.7
Europe  & Mediterranean  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.4  0.8  1.1
Middle  East  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.0  -0.2  -0.2  0.1
Latin  America  & Caribbean  7.5  6.0  3.2  3.2  4.3  3.5  5.5  6.9  5.3  9.5
Gross  flows  I
Total  all  countries  62.3  53.7  48.9  53.4  48.0  76.0  109.7  138.0  181.8
Developing  countries  (IBRD)  12.3  11.0  8.2  8.6  10.2  9.4  12.9  19.3  20.7
Flows  to  developing  countries
as share  of total  (percent)  19.7  20.5  16.8  16.1  21.3  12.4  11.8  14.0  11.4
Source:  InternationaL  Monetary  Fund:  World  Economic  Outlook  data  base  and Balance  of Payments  Statistics.
I/  Based  on WEO  data base,  data  are net of investment  made  abroad;  flows  are  to low-middle-income  countries;
data  exclude  flows  to offshore  financial  centers.
2/ Based  on the  Balance  of Payments  Statistics;  data  include  only  investments  made  in  a  country  by foreigners.
Data  are incomplete  as those  for  several  countries  are  not  availabLe.
32Table  A.3(1)
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  (Long-Term)  to  SOUTH  ASIA
(USS  Millions)
1970  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Official  Development  Finance  1,257.8  4,745.9  4,275.6  4,646.4  4,143.8  4,205.6  4,336.5  5,057.0  6,037.0  7,020.0  7,105.8
Official  Dev.  Assistance  1,169.3  4,547.0  3,969.7  4,247.4  3,583.9  3,854.7  3,947.0  4,431.0  4,858.7  4,938.2  4,810.8 Officiat  Grants  /1  266.5  2,362.3  1,844.6  1,693.0  1,581.6  1,673.4  1,401.7  1,755.3  1,838.7  2,145.0  2,244.8 Off.  Concess.  Loans  902.8  2,184.7  2,125.1  2,554.4  2,002.3  2,181.3  2,545.3  2,675.7  3,020.0  2,793.2  2,566.0 Bilateral  834.3  1,093.4  828.2  772.7  535.5  520.5  659.0  1,142.8  1,174.7  1,129.1  1,061.8 Multilateral  68.5  1,091.3  1,297.0  1,781.7  1,466.9  1,660.8  1,886.2  1,532.9  1,845.3  1,664.2  1,504.2 Off.  Non  Concess.  Loans  88.4  198.9  305.9  399.0  559.9  350.9  389.6  626.0  1,178.4  2,081.8  2,295.1 BLa,teral  25.2  63.8  (45.6)  80.0  123.9  46.2  101.5  37.0  75.7  112.1  494.6 MuItIl  .. I.  r.It  63.2  135.2  351.5  319.0  435.9  304.7  288.1  589.0  1,102.7  1,969.7  1,800.4
Private  flow-  45.9  899.1  948.0  1,579.0  738.4  1,975.8  1,301.0  1,958.2  1,743.6  1,956.8  2,082.6
Pri%atc  Loans  17.2  784.8  781.1  1,391.9  610.9  1,828.6  984.0  1,624.9  1,362.3  1,454.9  1,538.6 Commercial  Banks  6.2  645.1  568.0  882.7  388.6  799.7  582.6  831.7  1,333.5  995.1  849.0 Bonds  (3.4)  0.0  0.0  9.5  18.7  232.1  319.9  339.1  110.3  602.6  678.4 Other  14.4  139.6  213.1  499.7  203.6  796.9  81.6  454.1  (81.5)  (142.9)  11.2
foreign  Direct  Investment  12  28.7  114.3  166.9  187.1  127.5  147.2  317.0  333.3  381.3  501.9  544.0
AGGREGATE  NET FLOWS  1,303.7  5,645.0  5,223.6  6,225.4  4,882.2  6,181.4  5,637.5  7,015.2  7,780.6  8,976.8  9,188.4 AGGREGATE  NET  TRANSFERS  1,004.5  4745.8  4301.2  5047.7  3387.9  4552  3658.9  4549  4907.3  5643.8  5393.3
INDICATORS  OF FLOWS:
Conc.  ODA/7ot.  Resource  Flows  (M)  89.7%  80.5%  76.0%  68.2%  73.4%  62.4%  70.0%  63.2%  62.4%  55.0%  52.4%
TDS/Total  Resource  Flows  (%)  58.5%  36.1%  39.9%  36.94  64.7%  50.1%  66.4%  73.7%  70.1%  67.7%  70.3%
Total  Resource  Flows/GDP  (%)  1.5%  2.3%  2.3%  2.6%  1.9%  2.5%  2.1%  2.4%  2.4%  2.6%  2.6%
Total  Resource  Flows/GDI  (X)  30.3%  10.6%  8.5%  10.5%  8.2%  10.5%  7.9/  9.6b'.  10.1%  10.4-  11.1%
Tot.  Res.  Flows  Per  Cap.  (units)  2  6  6  7  5  6  7  7  8  8
1/  Excluding  Tech.  Coop.  grants
2/ tMF  dataTable  A.3(2)
Aggregate  Net  Resource Flows  (Long-Term)  to  BANGLADESH
(USt  Millions)
1971*  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1iB8  1989
Official  Development  Finance  15.4  1,584.2  997.7  1,316.7  935.9  1,079.3  1,037.6  1,415.7  1,494.8  1,401.1  1,639.5
Official  Dev. Assistance  15.4  1,587.6  990.8  1.281.2  947.7  1,079.1  1,041.9  1,349.8  1,513.7  1,404.5  1,644.3 Official  Grants  /1  0  1,001.0  543.5  759.0  507.6  595.3  472.1  552.8  709.4  669.4  766.7 Off.  Concess.  loans  0  586.6  447.3  522.2  440.1  483.8  569.8  797.0  804.3  735.1  877.6 Bilateral  0  323.4  202.8  276.7  165.7  142.6  115.4  290.4  290.1  227.7  281.6 Multilateral  0  263.3  244.4  245.5  274.4  341.2  454.4  506.7  514.1  507.3  596.0 Off.  Non  Concess.  Loans  0  (3-5)  7.0  35.4  (11.8)  0.2  (4.3)  65.9  (18.9)  (3.4)  (4.8) Bilateral  0  (3.8)  1.8  7.6  5.6  0.0  6.5  27.5  3.1  (4.9)  0.3 Multilateral  0  0.4  5.2  27.9  (17.4)  0.2  (10.8)  38.4  (22.0)  1.6  (5.0)
Private  Ftows  0  12.5  13.2  20.8  48.1  26.7  (6.5)  56.9  5.6  (19.4)  (31.2)
Private  Loans  0  12.5  13.2  20.8  47.7  27.3  (6.5)  54.5  2.4  (21.2)  (32.3) Coewnercial  Banks  0  0.0  0.0  4.0  (0.5)  (0.4)  (0.5)  (0.7)  (0.8)  (0.7)  (0.7) Bonds  0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 Other  0  12.5  13.2  16.8  48.2  27.7  (6.0)  55.1  3.2  (20.4)  (31.6)
Foreign  Direct  Investment  /2  0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  (0.6)  0.0  2.4  3.2  1.8  1.1
>  .....  ~~~~~~~~~~........  --  --  - --  --  - --  --  - --  --  - --  --  - --------  -------.  --  --  - -------- AGGREGATE  NET  FLOWS  15.4  1,596.7  1,011.0  1,337.5  984.0  1,106.0  1,031.1  1,472.5  1,500.4  1,381.7  1,608.3 AGGREGATE  NET TRANSFERS  15.4  1,549.8  956.1  1,278.4  918.6  1,034.0  940.2  1,364.1  1,362.1  1,241.1  1,469.5
INDICATORS  OF FLOWS:
Conc.  ODA/Tot.  Resource  Flows  (%)  100.0%  99.4%  98.1%  95.8%  96.3%  97.6%  101.0%  91.7%  100.9%  i1)1  i.
TDS/Total  Resource  Flows  (%)  0.0%  6.9%  13.4%  11.4%  13.0%  14.2%  19.5%  17.6%  20.1%  2...  19.5%
Total  Resource  Flows/GDP  (%)  0.2%  12.5%  7.1%  10.1%  8.1%  7.9%  6.4%  9.5%  8.5%  7.3%  8.0%
Total  Resource  Flows/GDO  (.)  2.0%  82.9%  44.4%  67.3%  59.6%  64.0%  51.5%  76.8%  67.6%  61.7%  68.1%
Tot.  Res.  Flows  Per  Cap.  (units)  0  18  11  14  10  11  10  14  14  73  14
1/  Excluding  Tech.  Coop.  grants
2/  IMF data
*  No data  available  for  1970Table  A.3(3)
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  (Long-Term)  to INDIA
(USS  Millions)
1970  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Official  Development  Finance  763.1  1,583.0  1,926.8  1,775.5  1,880.8  1,716.8  1,825.4  1,950.9  3,034.7  3,359.5  3,27'.0
Official  Dcv.  Assistance  760.9  1,450.8  1,595.0  1,559.0  1,370.9  1,480.6  1,564.5  1,487.1  2,058.4  1,747.6  1,708.0
Official  Grants  /1  157.4  648.6  809.3  455.6  545.3  582.7  449.9  595.6  531.3  721.3  755.8
Off.  Concess.  Loans  603.5  802.2  785.7  1,103.4  825.6  897.9  1,114.6  891.5  1,527.1  1,026.3  952.2
Bilateral  550.3  134.3  (16.0)  (46.9)  (32.4)  77.2  103.3  299.0  664.4  343.3  497.3
Multilateral  53.2  667.9  801.7  1,150.3  858.0  820.8  1,011.4  592.5  262.7  683.0  454.9
Off.  Non  Concess.  Loans  2.2  132.2  331.8  216.5  509.9  236.2  260.9  463.8  976.3  1,611.9  1,568.0
Bilateral  (5.0)  23.3  (11.8)  8.3  125.3  44.6  29.8  (15.4)  78.3  66.7  384.2
Multilateral  7.3  108.8  343.6  208.3  384.6  191.6  231.1  479.2  898.0  1,545.2  1,183.8
Private  Flows  (5.8)  498.1  521.5  705.9  632.0  1,623.2  1,329.8  1,752.4  1,477.0  2,000.4  2,030.7
Private  Loans  (11.8)  490.1  511.5  645.9  572.0  1,563.2  1,169.8  1,556.4  1,287.2  1,731.6  1,700.4
Comierciat  Banks  6.2  490.3  491.9  289.3  494.9  590.4  704.9  809.4  1,214.9  1,187.3  862.3
Bonds  0.0  0.0  0.0  9.5  18.7  232.1  319.9  339.1  110.3  602.6  678.4
Other  (18.0)  (0.2)  19.6  347.1  58  4  740.8  145.0  407.9  (37.9)  (58.3)  159.7
in  Foreign  Direct  Investment  /2  6.0  8.0  10.0  60.0  60.0  60.0  160.0  196.0  189.8  268.8  330.3
AGGREGATE  NET  FLOWS  757.3  2,081.1  2,448.3  2,481.4  2,512.8  3,340.0  3,155.2  3,703.3  4,511.7  5,359.9  5,306.7
AGGREGATE  NET  TRANSFERS  564.6  1,577.6  1,899.5  1,759.9  1,579.6  2,315.3  1,844.2  1,978.5  2,442.3  2,849.6  2,352.3
INDICATORS  OF FLOWS:
Conc.  ODA/Tot.  Resource  Flows  (%)  100.5%  69.7/  65.1%  62.8%  54.6%  44.3%  49.6X  40.2%  45.6%  352..  52  2'.
7DS/Total  Resource  Flows  (X)  66.9%  54.7%  47.9%  52.7%  64.7%  50.1%  66.6%  91.2%  78.1%  75.6%  83.5%
Total  Resource  Flows/GDP  (%)  1.3%  1.2%  1.4%  1.3%  1.3%  1.7%  1.5%  1.6%  1.8%  2.0%  2.0%
Total  Resource  Flows/GDI  (%)  7.7/.  5.3%  5.3%  5.7%  5.6%  7.  7  5.8%  6.6%  7.7%/  8.1%  8.5%
Tot.  Res.  Flows  Per  Cap.  (units)  1  3  3  3  3  4  4  5  6  7  6
I/  Excluding  Tech.  Coop.  grants
2/ IMF/WEO  dataTabte  A.3(4)
Aggregate  Net Resource  Flows  (Long-Term)  to  PAKISTAN
(USS  Millions)
1970  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Official  Development  Finance  430.0  1,022.4  689.7  873.4  599.5  674.0  700.0  762.9  697.2  1,382.5  1,436.2
Official  Dev.  Assistance  348.4  938.5  726.5  750.4  576.5  574.8  560.5  662.1  489.7  929.2  751.7 Official  Grants 11  78.9  432.0  259.1  252.0  277.3  245.7  257.4  314.5  300.8  424.1  408.3 Off.  Concess.  Loans  269.5  456.5  467.4  498.4  299.2  329.1  303.1  347.6  188.9  505.1  343.4 Bilateral  252.1  365.4  347.7  276.7  130.8  56.5  55.4  146.7  (51.3)  253.3  65.0 Multilateral  17.4  91.1  119.7  221.7  168.3  272.6  247.6  200.9  240.2  251.8  278.4 Off.  Non  Corcess.  Loans  81.6  83.8  (36.8)  123.0  23.0  99.2  139.6  100.8  207.5  453.4  684.4 Bilateral  27.0  56.7  (38.1)  48.1  (34.2)  (3.4)  71.9  21.4  (20.2)  31.2  63.3 Multilateral  4,554.5  27.2  1.3  74.8  57.2  102.6  67.7  79.4  227.8  422.2  621.1
Private  Flows  48.7  230.6  87.2  510.9  (57.2)  218.3  (33.0)  163.3  265.6  32.8  183.8
Private  Loans  25.7  167.3  (20.4)  447.4  (86.5)  163.1  (163.8)  58.1  136.8  (152.8)  (9.2) Conrnercial  Banks  0.9  93.3  5.7  479.9  (178.9)  154.3  (153.0)  44.3  199.6  (118.3)  43.0 Bonds  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 Other  24.8  74.0  (26.1)  (32.5)  92.4  A.8  (10.8)  13.8  (62.8)  (34.5)  (52.1)
LW3  Foreign  Direct  Investment  /2  23.0  63.3  107.6  63.5  29.3  55.2  130.8  105.2  128.8  185.6  193.0 ... .-  . . . - .. .
AGGREGATE  NET FLOWS  478.7  1,252.9  776.9  1,384.3  542.4  892.4  667.0  926.2  962.8  1,415.3  1,620.0 AGGREGATE  NET TRANSFERS  395.2  998.5  570.0  1,122.6  219.3  545.2  294.8  525.8  516.0  922.7  1,121.6
INDICATORS OF FLOWS:
Conc.  ODA/Tot.  Resource  Flows  (%)  72.8%  74.9%  93.5%  54.2%  106.2%  64.4%  84.0%  71.c.%  50.9%  65.o%  46.4%
TDS/Total  Resource  Flows  (%)  40.3%  48.0%  71.8%  42.4%  203.5%  103.5%  156.6%  113.1%  119.9%  90.6%  78.2%
Total  Resource  Flows/GOP  (%)  4.8%  5.3%  2.8%  4.5%  1.9%  2.9%  2.1%  2.9%  2.9%  3.7%  0%
Total  Resource  Flows/GDI  (%)  30.2%  28.6%  14.7%  23.4%  10.1%  15.7%  11.7%  15.5%  15.1%  20.4%  22.8%
Tot.  Res.  Flows  Per  Cap.  (units)  8  15  9  16  6  10  7  9  9  13  15
1/  Excluding  Tech.  Coop.  grants
2/  IMF  dataTable  A.3(5)
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  (Long-Term)  to  SRI LANKA
(USS  Millions)
1970  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Official  Development  Finance  54.1  295.5  340.4  344.3  424.0  439.8  447.6  505.1  442.5  484.5  469.9
Official  Dev.  Assistance  47.9  302.6  344.0  341.3  416.5  433.2  447.3  502.7  430.6  467.3  422.2
Official  Grants  /1  14.4  161.0  177.9  170.7  183.7  180.1  150.9  174.5  192.3  198.1  200.4
Off.  Concess.  Loans  33.5  141.6  166.1  170.6  232.8  2¶3.1  296.4  328.2  238.3  269.2  221.8
Bilateral  34.1  112.9  108.0  95.5  141.9  144.5  187.8  202.9  106.4  153.2  127.0
Multilateral  (0.7)  28.7  57.2  75.1  90.8  108.6  108.6  125.3  131.9  116.0  94.8
Off.  Non  Concess.  Loans  6.2  (7.1)  (3.6)  3.0  7.6  6.6  0.3  2.5  11.9  17.2  47.7
Bilateral  3.8  (5.3)  (1.5)  (2.0)  (4.6)  (3.9)  (0.6)  4.3  12.7  16.3  46.8
Multilateral  2.4  (1.7)  (2.0)  5.0  12.2  10.5  0.9  (1.8)  (0.8)  0.9  0.9
Private  Flows  (3.8)  129.1  231.7  285.8  96.4  114.4  69.2  39.0  (3.5)  (46.0)  (30.0)
Private  Loans  (3.5)  86.1  182.4  222.2  58.6  81.8  43.0  9.3  (63.0)  (91.7)  (49.6)
Coxnmercial  Banks  (0.8)  59.2  94.8  114.8  58.7  56.6  39.1  (13.5)  (76.2)  (66.3)  (48.6)
Bonds  (3.4)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Other  0.7  26.9  87.6  107.4  (0.1)  25.1  3.9  22.7  13.2  (25.5)  (0.9)
Foreign  Direct  Investment  /2  (0.3)  43.0  49.3  63.6  37.8  32.6  26.2  29.7  59.5  45.7  19.6
4  .......  --------  . - ..  - - . .......- I.  . --------  ........
AGGREGATE  NET FLOWS  50.3  424.6  572.1  630.1  520.4  554.2  516.8  544.1  439.0  438.5  439.9
AGGREGATE  NET TRANSFERS  30.0  377.2  515.7  550.8  417.4  436.3  389.4  407.4  295.7  294.0  309.4
INOICATORS  OF FLOUS:
Conc.  ODA/Tot.  Resource  Flows  (%)  95.6%  71.2%  60.1%  54.1%  80.0%  78.2%  86.5%  S2.4%  98.1%  1  06.5%  96.0%
T0S/To%al  Resource  Flows  (%)  83.8%  19.8%  16.6%  22.8%  31.9%  35.8%  44.1%  49.4X  75.7%  15.2%  66.4%
Total  Resource  Flows/GDP  (%)  2.5%  10.6%  13.0%  12.8%  9.9%  9.2%  8.5%  8.4%  6.5%  6.2%  6.2%
Total  Resource  Flows/GDI  (%)  13.3%  31.3%  46.6%  43.0%  34.9%  35.5%  36.3%  35.9%  28.1%  27.6%  29.0%
Total  Res.  Flows  Per  Cap.  (units)  4  29  38  41  34  35  33  34  27  26  26
1/ Excluding  Tech.  Coop.  grants
2/ IMF  dataTable A.4(1)
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Fltows  (Long-Ternm)  to  ASEAN  COLNTRIES
(USS  Mitlions)
1970  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Official  Developnent Finance  569.1  2,101.5  2,971.1  2,715.2  3,608.8  4,001.5  2,453.5  2,285.4  3,836.8  3,768.9  3,854.4
Official  Dev. Assistance  515.1  1,001.9  1,400.5  1,021.5  1,116.9  1,321.6  1,108.4  1,405.7  2,920.6  2,634.5  2,729.4 Offic?al  Grants /1  110.3  249.2  279.1  230.3  279.8  385.8  404.2  775.9  683.2  539.0  657.2 Off.  Concess. Loans  404.8  752.7  1,121.4  791.2  837.1  935.8  704.2  629.8  2,237.4  2,095.5  2,072.2 8ilateral  383.4  713.6  1,031.6  695.9  730.2  849.3  644.6  568.2  2,191.6  2,018.0  2,005.1 Multilateral  21.3  39.1  89.9  95.3  107.0  86.5  59.6  61.6  45.8  77.5  67.1 Off.  Non  Concess. Loans  54.1  1,099.5  1,570.6  1,693.7  2,491.8  2,679.9  1,345.1  879.7  916.2  1,134.4  1,124.9 Bilateral  31.1  185.0  274.1  288.0  678.2  1,080.5  20.7  (113.8)  (497.4)  (85.1)  1340.1) Multilateral  23.0  914.5  1,296.5  1,405.7  1,813.6  1,599.4  1,324.4  993.5  1,413.6  1,219.5  1,465.1
Private  Flows  499.7  5,189.2  6,653.7  8,629.9  8,739.4  5,358.5  3,098.6  2,346.4  94.4  165.0  5,311.9
Private  Loans  304.7  3,991.4  4,793.4  6,800.8  6,732.3  3,929.0  1,918.7  1,210.0  (1,433.2)  (3,138.1)  549.7 Conmerc.al Banks  298.7  3,546.1  4,167.6  4,731.2  3,561.1  2,398.2  (1,203.1)  1,232.7  (610.1)  (1,779.6)  2,005.4 Bonds  (30.8)  153.7  77.3  979.5  1,737.9  183.4  2,113.1  247.4  (137.2)  (663.0)  (467.3) Other  36.8  291.6  548.6  1,090.1  1,433.3  1,347.4  1,008.7  (270.1)  (685.8)  (695.4)  (988.4)
;^,  Fore,gn Direct  Investment /2  195.0  1,197.8  1,860.3  1,829.1  2,007.1  1,429.5  1,179.9  1,136.4  1,527.6  3,303.1  4,762.2 0o  ..  ....  --------  ........  --------  .....  ----- I--  . .....  ........  --------  ........ AGGREGATE  NET  FLOWS  1068.9  7,290.6  9,624.8  11,345.0  12,348.2.  9,359.9  5,552.1  4,631.8  3,931.3  3,933.9  9,166.3 AGGREGATE  NET  TRANSFERS  584.2  68.5  881.9  2,289.5  3,028.5  126.2  (3,214.9)  (3,726.8,  (5,347.6)  (6,281.2)  (1.619.3)
INDICATORS  OF FLOUS:
Conc. ODA/Tot. Resource  Flows (X)  48.2%  13.7%  14.5%  9.0%  9.0%  14.1%  20.0%  30.3%  74.3%  67.0%  29.8%
TDS/Total Resource  Flows (%)  66.9%  80.3%  73.1%  72.4%  71.5%  110.2%  257.3%  297.9%  420.2X  511.7%  198.4%
Total  Resource  Flows/GOP  (%)  51.4%  4.3%  5.0%  5.8%  6.5%  4.8%  2.9%  2.6%  2.1%  1.8%  3.7%
Total  Resource  Flows/GDI (%)  18.4%  15.9%  16.9%  20.4%  22.3%  18.7%  11.9%  10.8%  8.0%  6.6%  12.4%
Tot.  Res. Ftows Per Cap. (units)  1  28  36  42  45  33  19  16  13  13  29
1/  Excluding Tech. Coop. grants
2/  IMF  dataTabte  A.4t2)
Aggregate  Met  Resource Flows  (Long-Term)  to  INDONESIA
(USS Millions)
1970  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
..-  ---  . ...  . ---  ---  ....  ----.  ----  ----  ----  ----... Official  Development  Finance  438.5  915.4  1,110.1  1,218.2  1,289.9  1,464.7  1,167.6  1,176.2  2,727.7  3,122.8  2,552.6
Official  Dev.  Assistance  8.4  561.9  719.0  555.6  482.4  424.2  388.2  330.2  1,528.2  1,249.2  1,334.5 Official  Grants  I1  3,357.6  108.6  124.3  92.1  103.9  123.1  136.4  135.7  195.2  201.3  211.9 Off.  Concess.  Loans  353.7  453.3  594.7  463.5  378.5  301.1  251.8  194.5  1,333.0  1,047.9  1,122.6 Bilateral  3.9  409.6  524.0  384.0  319.3  244.6  206.4  167.3  1,299.1  977.1  1,069.7 Multilateral  (3.0)  43.7  70.7  79.5  59.2  56.5  45.4  27.2  33.9  70.8  52.9 Off.  Non Concess.  Loans  (3.0)  353.6  391.2  662.6  807.5  1,040.5  779.4  846.0  1,199.5  1,873.6  1,218.1 Bilateral  0.0  4.0  43.6  123.7  258.6  229.3  33.0  98.3  (86.5)  242.4  (139.1) Multilateral  349.6  347.5  538.8  548.9  811.2  746.4  747.8  1,286.0  1,631.1  1,357.1
Private  Flows  244.9  986.2  1,202.5  1,567.2  2,995.2  1,544.3  525.8  1,118.2  283.9  (657.4)  584.8
Pr;vate  Loans  161.9  806.2  1,069.5  1,342.2  2,703.2  1,322.3  215.8  860.2  (162.1)  (,199.4)  (150.2) Coanrerciat  Banks  133.7  825.2  935.7  410.8  1,459.6  572.2  (170.8)  682.4  210.4  (405.5)  802.8 Bonds  0.0  39.7  41.2  311.3  358.5  (44.9)  (40.4)  268.6  (51.7)  (158.3)  (176.4) other  28.2  (58.8)  92.6  620.1  885.1  795.0  427.0  (90.8)  (320.7)  (635.6)  (776.7;
LO  Foreign  Direct  Investment  /2  83.0  180.0  133.0  225.0  292.0  222.0  ;10.0  258.0  446.0  542.0  735.0 q)~~~~~~~~~~~~~-  - - - - - --  - - - - - I  - - - .- - - - - . . . - - - - - - . . . . . . ..  . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - AGGREGATE  NET FLOUS  683.4  1,901.6  2,312.6  2,785.3  4,285.1  3,009.0  1,693.4  2,294.4  3,011.6  2,465.3  3,137.4 AGGREGATE  NET TRANSFERS  509.9  (2,513.9)  (3,140.1)  (2,676.0)  (952.0)  (1,661.8)  (2,372.1)  (1,499.2)  (996.9)  (1,772.1)  (1646.8) ...---  --  --  - --  - --  . . - - - ...  ...  ..  --  - - ---  ---  -------  --  --  - --  --  - . ..  .....
IUDICATORS  OF FLOWS:
Conc.  OOA/Tot.  Resource  Flows  (M)  64.6%  29.5%  31.1%  19.9%  11.3%  14.1%  22.9%  10.5%  50.8%  50.7%  '.'  '%
TDS/Total  Resource  Flows  (%)  24.1%  148.0%  139.2%  125.5%  84.9%  139.2Z%  295.7%  239.7%  221.5%  345.1%  'S7. 7%
Total  Resource  Flows/GDP (X)  7.1%  2.4%  2.5%  2.9%  5.0%  3.4%  1.9%  2.7%  4.0%  2.9%  3.3%
Total  Resource  Flows/GDI  tX)  44.7%  10.0%  8.4%  10.7%  17.5%  13.1%  6.9%  9.7%  12.6%  9.3%  9.6%
Tot.  Res.  flows  Per  Cap.  (units)  6  13  15  18  27  19  10  13  18  14  18
1/  Excluding  Tech.  Coop. grants
2/  IMF dataTable  A.4(3)
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  (Long-Term)  to  MALAYSIA
(US$  Millions)
1970  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Official  Development  Finance  27.4  138.9  292.3  172.0  310.6  859.6  73.8  17.3  (111.2)  (58.7)  (154.4)
Official  Dev.  Assistance  25.1  55.1  82.5  9.9  93.1  287.9  71.1  95.4  90.7  64.6  87.4
Official  Grants  /1  4.0  6.4  7.4  5.3  10.6  16.8  8.9  87.8  28.4  19.2  17.8
Oft.  Concess.  Loans  21.1  48.7  75.1  4.6  82.5  271.1  62.2  7.6  62.3  45.4  69.6
Bilateral  12.1  61.0  88.2  18.4  90.3  284.2  77.8  27.8  82.5  59.2  78.7
Multitateral  9.0  (12.3)  (13.0)  (13.8)  (7.7)  (13.1)  (15.6)  (20.2)  (20.2)  (13.7)  (9.0)
Off.  Non  Concess.  Loans  2.2  83.8  209.7  162.1  217.5  571.7  2.7  (78.0)  (201.9)  (123.3)  (241.8)
Bitlateral  (5.6)  (13.1)  94.9  17.2  96.0  498.6  (29.9)  (72.6)  (237.2)  (133.2)  (271.0)
Multilateral  7.9  96.9  114.8  144.8  121.5  73.1  32.6  (5.4)  35.3  9.9  29.2
Private  Flows  71.4  1,912.8  3,312.0  5,146.6  4,121.2  2,320.7  792.8  1,086.8  (49.8)  (1,030.2)  1,336.0
Private  Loans  (22.6)  978.9  2,047.3  3,749.4  2,860.7  1,523.2  98.1  597.9  (472.5)  (1,749.6)  (509.8)
Commercial  Banks  2.8  715.7  1,806.6  2,903.0  1,293.7  1,181.2  (2,303.7)  455.9  (371.1)  (1,016.2)  (116.3)
Bonds  (29.9)  (10.7)  (3.6)  594.0  1,223.4  180.6  2,252.8  149.4  147.9  (442.3)  (92.8)
Other  4.5  273.9  244.3  252.4  343.6  161.4  149.0  (7.3)  (249.3)  (291.0)  (300.8)
O1-  Foreign  Direct  Investment  /2  94.0  933.9  1,264.7  1,397.2  1,260.5  797.5  694.7  488.9  422.7  719.4  1,845.8
AGGREGATE  NET FLOUS  98.8  2,051.7  3,604.3  5,318.6  4,431.8  3,180.3  866.6  1,104.2  (161.0)  (1,088.8)  1,181.6
AGGREGATE  NET TRANSFERS  -92.5  524.0  2,073.2  3,585.3  2,229.1  523.0  (1,810.8)  (1,127.9)  (2,743.5)  (3,904.6)  (1,480.6)
INDICAfORS  OF FLOUS
Conc.  ODA/Tot.  Resource  Flows  (%)  25.4%  2.7%  2.3%  0.2%  2.1%  9.1%  8.2%  8.6%  -56.4%  -5.9%  7_4%
TDS/Total  Resource  Flows  (%)  82.8%  33.3%  26.3%  24.8%  37.8%  77.1%  593.9%  292.9%  -2539.5%  -484.4%  341.4%
Total  Resource  Flows/GOP  (%)  2.4%  8.4%  14.4%  19.8%  14.7%  9.4%  2.8%  4.0%  -0.5%  -3.1%  3.2%
Total  Resource  Flows/GOI  (Z)  10.5%  27.5%  41.2%  53.2%  38.9%  27.9%  10.1%  15.3%  -2.2%  -12.1%  10.6%
Tot.  Res.  Flows  Per  Cap.  (units)  9  149  256  367  297  208  55  69  (10)  (64)  68
1/  Excluding  Tech.  Coop.  grants
2/  IMF  dataTable  A.4(4)
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  (Long-Term)  to  PHILIPPINES
(USS Millions)
1970  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Official  Development  Finance  75.9  425.3  846.9  604.5  1,086.8  911.8  511.3  619.8  1,052.2  1,004.3  1,357.4
Official  Dev.  Assistance  31.1  148.3  328.1  210.8  245.8  301.1  324.7  651.4  979.8  972.9  869.8
Official  Grants  fI  16.2  59.2  70.0  69.5  83.1  138.9  138.5  400.5  330.6  219.6  304.3
Off.  Concess.  Loans  14.9  89.1  258.1  141.3  162.7  162.2  186.2  250.6  649.2  753.3  565.5
Bilateral  11.6  78.1  244.4  129.9  132.0  151.3  177.3  218.4  613.8  725.2  531.1
Multilateral  3.4  11.0  13.7  11.3  30.7  10.9  8.9  32.2  35.5  28.1  34.4
Off.  Non Concess.  Loans  44.8  277.0  518.8  393.7  841.1  610.8  186.6  (31.6)  72.4  31.3  487.5
Bilateral  36.0  12.3  11.7  102.5  171.8  246.9  (53.3)  (131.2)  (27.6)  (19.3)  200.7
Multitaterat  8.7  264.6  507.1  291.2  669.2  363.8  239.9  99.7  100.0  50.7  286.9
Private  ftows  72.0  845.3  899.8  1,057.8  856.8  243.8  678.1  330.3  (491.3)  245.9  147.3
Private  Loans  97.0  951.3  727.8  1,041.8  751.8  234.8  666.1  203.3  (798.3)  (690.1)  (334.7)
Conmerciat  Banks  100.6  771.2  668.6  969.5  508.5  35.3  535.6  257.2  (631.3)  (683.6)  (246.5)
Bonds  (0.9)  80.4  (5.8)  34.0  41.3  (54.2)  (115.5)  (51.1)  (148.5)  (163.3)  (174.0)
Other  (2.7)  99.7  64.9  38.3  201.9  253.7  245.9  (2.7)  (18.4)  156.7  85.9
X__  Foreign  Direct  Investment  /2  (25.0)  (106.0)  172.0  16.0  105.0  9.0  12.0  127.0  307.0  936.3  482.0
AGGREGATE  NET FLOWS  147.9  1,270.6  1,746.6  1,662.2  1,943.6  1,155.6  1,189.4  950.1  560.9  1,250.1  1,504.7
AGGREGATE  NET  TRANSFERS  79.8  498.3  734.1  537.0  841.0  126.1  107.8  (328.8)  (1,029.4)  (535.9)  (487.2)
INDICATORS  OF FLOWS:
Conc.  ODA/Tot.  Resource  Flows  (X)  21.0%  11.7%  18.8%  12.7%  12.6%  26.0%  27.3%  68.6%  174.8%  77.8%  57.8%
IDS/Total  Resource  Ftows  (%)  205.1%  8.7%  88.3%  113.7%  90.8%  125.4%  131.5%  237.7%  501.4%  229.6%  178.3%
Total  Resource  Flows/GDP  (%)  2.1%  3.6%  4.5%  4.2%  5.6%  3.6%  3.6%  3.1%  1.6%  3.2%  3.4%
Total  Resource  Flows/GDI  (X)  9.7%  11.8%  14.8%  14.7%  21.0%  21.0%  25.9%  23.9%  10.4%  18.4%  18.2%
Tot.  Res.  Flows  Per  Cap.  (units)  4  26  35  32  37  21  21  17  10  21  25
1/  Excludinig  Tech.  Coop.  grants
2/ IMF  dataTabte A.4(5)
Aggregate Net Resource  Flows (Long-Term) to  THAILAID
(USS  Mitlions)
1970  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
---  ....  ..  ..  ..  ..  ....  - - - - - - - --  - Officiat  Development  Finance  27.4  621.9  721.9  720.6  921.4  765.4  700.7  472.1  168.2  (299.5)  98.8
Official  Dev.  Assistance  17.3  236.8  271.0  245.2  295.7  308.4  324.4  328.8  322.0  347.8  437.7 Official  Grants  /1  6.2  75.0  77.4  63.4  82.2  107.0  120.4  151.6  129.0  98.9  123.2 Off'  Concess.  loans  11.1  161.8  193.6  181.8  213.5  201.4  204.0  177.2  193.0  248.9  314.5 Bilateral  6.0  165.0  175.0  163.5  188.6  169.3  183.1  154.7  196.3  256.6  325.7 Multilateral  5.1  (3.2)  18.6  18.2  24.8  32.1  20.8  22.5  (3.3)  (7.7)  (11.2) Off.  Non  Concess.  Loans  10.1  385.1  450.9  475.4  625.7  456.9  376.4  143.3  0153.8) 16472.) (338.9) Bilateral  3.7  il1.8  123.9  44.5  151.7  105.6  70.9  (8.2)  (146.1) (175.0) (130.8) Multilateral  6.4  203.4  327.0  430.9  474.0  351.3  305.5  151.5  (7.7) (472.2) (208.1)
Private  Flows  111.4  1,444.9 1,239.4  858.3  766.3  1,249.6 1,102.0  (188.9)  351.6  1,606.8 3,243.8
Private  Loans  68.4  1,255.0  948.8  667.4  416.7  848.6  938.8  (451.4)  (0.3)  501.1  1,544.4 Commercial  Banks  61.5  1,234.0  756.6  447.8  299.3  609.4  735.8  (162.7)  181.9  325.6  1,565.4 Bonds  0.0  44.3  45.5  40.3  114.7  101.9  16.2  (119.4)  (84.9)  100.9  (24.2) Other  6.9  (23.3)  146.8  179.4  2.7  137.3  186.8  (169.3)  (97.3)  74.5  3.2
Foreign  Direct  Investment  12  43.0  189.9  290.6  190.9  349.6  401.0  163.2  262.5  351.9  1,105.7 1,699.4
AGGREGATE  NET  FLOWS  18.8  2,066.8 1,961.2 1,578.9 1,687.7 2.015.0 1,802.7  283.2  519.8  1,307.3 3,342.6 AGGREGATE  NET  TRANSFERS  87.0  1,560.1 1,214.6  843.1  910.4  1,133.9  860.3  (771.0) (577.8)  (68.7)  1,995.3
INDICATORS  OF  FLOUS:
Conc.  ODA/Tot.  Resource  Flows  (2)  12.40t  11.5%  13.8%  15.5%  17.5%  15.3%  18.0%  116.1%  61.9%  26.6%  13.1%
TDS/Total  Resource  Flows  (%)  117.1%  60.2%  67.7%  95.4%  104.0%  110.4%  142.4% 1077.4%  567.4%  270.0%  101.3%
Total  Resource  flows/GDP  (%)  2.0%  6.4%  5.6%  4.4%  4.3%  4.9%  4.8%  0.7%  1.1%  2.2%  4.8%
lotal  Resource  Flows/GDI  {X)  7.7%  24.3%  21.4%  19.2%  16.4%  19.6%  20.1%  3.1%  4.2%  7.6%  15.4%
Tot.  Res.  Flows  Per  Cap.  (units)  4  44  41  32  34  40  35  5  10  24  61
--...-.------.---------...-..----- 
1/  Excluding  Tech.  Coop.  grants
2/  IMF  dataTable AS. External Debt Indicators - 1989
(percentage)
Debt  Interest/
Debt/GNP  DebtLExDorts  Service Ratio  Exports
Indonesia  60  211  35  15
Malaysia  52  64  15  5
Philippines  66  226  26  17
Thailand  34  85  15  6
Bangladesh  53  438  20  8
India  24  258  26  14
Pakistan  47  243  23  10
Sri Lanka  74  223  18  7
43Table  A6.  Vulnerability  Coefficients  - 1989
(percentage  shares  in total  debt)
Share  of  Share  of  Share  of  Share  of
Concessional  Multilateral  Variable  Short-term
Debt  Debt  Debt  Debt
Indonesia  28.6  22.4  32.5  13.2
Malaysia  9.9  7.9  44.8  14.7
Philippines  18.2  17.2  36.9  13.7
Thailand  15.2  14.2  38.0  26.0
Bangladesh  90.5  47.8  0.0  0.6
India  41.2  31.5  17.3  7.5
Pakistan  60.7  29.8  9.2  15.0
Sri  Lanka  69.1  24.0  5.0  7.7
44Table  A7.  Economic  Indicators
ExportL  of
GDP  Growth  Goods  & NFS  ICOR
1965-89  1965-89  1965-89
Bangladesh  3.2  5.1  4.1
India  4.1  5.9  5.1
Pakistan  5.8  5.2  3.3
Sri  Lanka  4.8  1.4  4.8
S.Axia  4.1  5.2  5.1
Indonesia  6.5  5.4  3.8
Malaysia  6.8  8.2  4.3
Philippines  4.3  5.5  6.3
Thailand  6.9  9.6  3.6
ASEAN  6.2  7.0  4.2
45Table  A8.  Proiected  Long-term  Net  Flows  of External  Finance
to Developina  Countries
(in billions  of US$)
Projected
Actual  Est.  Average  Growth
1989  1990  1991-95  1990-95
OFFICIAL  34  49  60  5.3
Grants  18  20  25  5.6
Loans  16  29  35  5.0
Bilateral  12  17  21  7.4
Multilateral  6  10  12  5.7
IMF  -2  2  2
PRIVATE  32  28  45  14.2
Grants  4  4  5  7.6
Loans  4  2  10  42.0
FDI  24  22  30  10.3
TOTAL  66  77  105  8.9
46Table  A9.  Components  of  Capital  Flows
(USS million)
Official
Off  ici. N8vn3itL  Private  Workers
Grants  Loans  Loans  Loans  FDI  Total  Remittances
Bangladesh  208  282  591  -32  --  1049  771
India  332  882  1639  1700  425  4978  2650
Pakistan  408  128  900  -9  193  1620  1902
Sri  Lanka  105  174  96  -50  20  345  338
S. Asia  1053  1466  3226  1600  638  7992  5661
Indonesia  365  931  1410  -150  735  3291  125
Malaysia  114  -192  20  -510  1846  1278  --
Philippines  253  732  321  -335  482  1454  1358
Thailand  286  195  -219  1545  1699  3506  --
ASEAN  l018  1856  1.5  0.5  4752  9529  1483
47Table  A1O.  Potentia.  o'urces  of Net  Flows  to  Asia
Annual  Av.rage  $  billion
1990-99
South  Asia  ASEAN
Amount  %  Share  Amount  %  Share
Official  grants  1.0  7.0  0.5  4.0
Bilateral  loans  1.5  11.0  2.0  15.0
Multilateral  loans  3.0-3.5  23.0  1.5-2.0  13.0
Commercial  loans  1.5-2.0  12.0  2.0-2.5  17.0
FDI  1.5-2.0  13.0  5.0  42.0
Workers,  remittances  4.0-4.5  29.0  0.5  4.0
Others  0.5  4.0  0.5  4.0
TOTAL  13.6  100.0  11.8  100.0
14.0-15.0  b.  12.0-13.0  b.
48Talbe  11.f11  Aggregaae  Yet  Renource  Flows  to  South  Asia
(in millions  of USS)
1970  1980  1990
Danrladesh
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  n.a.  1,597  1,608
As % of GDP  n.a.  12.5%  7.0%
As % of GDI  n.a.  82.9%  61.3%
As  % of  Imports  n.a.  67.0%  39.0%
India
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  757  2,073  4,552
As % of GDP  1.3%  1.2%  1.6%
As  % of GDI  7.7%  5.3%  7.0%
As % of  Imports  29.4%  11.9%  14.0%
Pakistan
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  479  1,253  1,620
As  % of GDP  4.8%  5.3%  4.0%a/
As  % of GDI  30.2%  28.6%  22.8%
As % of  Imports  32.7%  21.9%  19.9%
Sri  Lanka
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  50  425  A45
As  % of  GDP  2.5%  10.6%  6.2%
As  % of GDI  13.3%  31.3%  29.0%
As % of  Imports  8.8%  19.3%  11.4%
Total  South  Asia
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  1,304  5,637  8,858a/
As  % of GDP  1.6%  2.6%  2.5%
As % of GDI  10.1%  11.6%  11.7%
As  %  Imports  22.9%  19.5%  19.9%
aI  1989  dataTalbe  11.(2)  Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  to  South  Asia
(in millions  of US$)
1970  1980  1990
Indonesia
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  683  1,902  3,291
As  % of GDP  71%  2.4%  3.2%
As  % of GDI  44.7%  10.0%  9.0%
As  %  of Imports  47.2%  12.1%  12.8%
Malaysia
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  99  2,053  1,278
As  % of GDP  2.4%  8.4%  3.0%
As  %  of GDI  10.5%  27.5%  10.6%
As  % of Imports  6.2%  15.2%  4.0%
Philippines
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  148  1,271  1,454
As  % of GDP  2.1%  3.6%  3.1%
As  % of GDI  9.7%  11.8%  16.6%
As  % of  Imports  10.6%  13.9%  10.9%
Thailand
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  139  2,067  3,506
As % of GDP  2.0%  6.4%  4.3%
As % of GDI  7.7%  24.3%  15.4%a/
As % of  Imports  10.1%  21.0%  10.7%
Total  ASEAN
Aggregate  Net  Resource  Flows  1,069  7,291  9,166a/
As % of GDP  3.8%  4.3%  3.7%
As % of GDI  18.4%  15.9%  12.4%
As  %  Imports  18.4%  15.1%  10.6%
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